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ABSTRACT 
Courts in various jurisdictions had to deal with the question whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can be 
held liable for infringing acts committed by their subscribers. It is perhaps the most controversial legal issue 
emerging in the digital environment. Although New Zealand courts have yet to deal with the issue of ISP 
liability for copyright infringement, the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) has suggested a statutory 
solution for this apparent problem, which was put down in the 2002 "Digital Technology and the Copyright Act 
1994" Position Paper. In the Position Paper, the MED proposes to exempt ISPs from liability for primary and 
secondary infringement under certain requirements. The suggested amendment of the Copyright Act raises 
several issues and questions, which will be addressed in this paper. The author argues that a total liability 
exemption fails to take all relevant policy factors into account and favours ISPs unilaterally. The paper suggests 
that ISPs do not need an exemption clause, because New Zealand's copyright law, although full of uncertainties, 
appears to be relatively narrow compared to other jurisdictions. The proposed reform causes more problems 
than it addresses. The constructive knowledge standard, which ISPs have to meet in order to fall under the 
liability exemption clauses, is difficult to determine and amplifies the existing uncertainties. The author suggests 
that instead of curing the symptoms, the legislator should get at the root of the problems, which is the cluttered 
secondary infringement provisions and the nebulous concept of authorisation, which is the true reason for the 
legal uncertainty copyright owners and lSPs are facing these days. 
Word Length 
The text of thi s paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and appendices) comprises 
approximately 11,970 words. 
IV 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Internet, which has been described as "one gigantic copying 
machine", 1 poses a major threat to copyright. The development of peer-to-
peer file-sharing technology,2 as represented by the late Napster and its 
successors eDonkey3 or Kazaa,4 has not insignificantly contributed to the 
media industry's slump of sales.5 The battle between the recording 
industry and those held responsible for the maintenance of file-sharing 
networks is mainly driven by the difficulties that copyright holders 
encounter defending their rights against individual infringers. The trouble 
is partly because it is not the single infringement, but the sum of 
infringements occurring on these networks, which cause considerable 
material damage. Although the music industry enjoyed recent success in 
forcing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the United States to reveal the 
identity of their subscribers,6 it is still comparatively problematic to 
identify individual infringers. Besides, suing every single infringer is not a 
very cost-effective approach, especially if the defendants are not 
sufficiently solvent to compensate for the damages incurred. 
These problems are not limited to peer-to-peer networks. It does not take 
much effort to set up websites containing infringing material, and ISPs play 
the most important role in providing the necessary technological facilities. 
From a copyright owner's point of view, it appears to be a logical 
development to look for more effective means to protect their rights by 
targeting those who enable others to infringe, and who benefit financially 
both from the non-infringing and infringing use of the Internet. Therefore, 
courts in various jurisdictions had to deal with the question whether ISPs 
1 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" [2000] NZLJ 180. 
2 Peer-to-peer commonly refers to a method of transferring files within a network that does 
not have fixed server and clients, but a number of peer nodes that may principally function 
both as server and client to other nodes on the network. 
3 <http://www.edonkey2000.com> (last accessed 9 July 2004). 
4 <http://www.kazaa.com> (last accessed 9 July 2004). 
5 It has been estimated that in 2002 sales of recorded music fell by almost I O per cent due 
to Internet-based file sharing, see Anonymous "The music industry: In a Spin" (March 
2003) The Econo111isr London 58. 
6 RIAA v Verizon lnremer Services Inc 351 F3d 1229 (DC Circ). 
can be held liable for infringing acts committed by their subscribers. It is 
perhaps the "most controversial legal issue emerging in the digital 
environment."7 Obviously, copyright owners and ISPs view this problem 
"from diametric positions".8 
Although New Zealand courts have yet to deal with the issue of ISP 
liability for copyright infringement, the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MED) has suggested a statutory solution for this apparent 
problem. The MED's view was put down in the 2001 "Digital Technology 
and the Copyright Act 1994" Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper),9 on 
which the MED received several submissions by concerned interest 
groups. 10 The results of this public consultation process were analysed and 
reviewed by the MED, and resulted in the release of the 2002 "Digital 
Technology and the Copyright Act 1994" Position Paper (Position 
Paper). 11 
In the Position Paper, the MED proposes to exempt ISPs from liability for 
primary and secondary infringement under certain requirements. The 
proposed provisions are tailored after the example of the European Union 
Electronic Commerce directive, which provide exemptions for ISPs 
providing a "mere conduit" to the Internet, transient caching and hosting. 12 
This also reflects the position under the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation's (WIPO) Internet Treaties. 13 The United provides similar 
7 Luca Timberi and Michele Zamboni "Liability of Service Providers" (2003) 9(2) CTLR 
49. 
8 Mary Ann Shulman "Internet Copyright Infringement Liability: Is an Online Access 
Provider more like a Landlord or a Dance Hall Operator?" (1997) 27 GGULR 555, 599. 
9 Ministry of Economic Development "Digital Technology and the Copyright Act 1994 
Discussion Paper" (July 2001) <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 9 July 2004). 
10 A summary of the submissions can be viewed on the Ministry's website. 
<http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 9 July 2004). 
11 Ministry of Economic Development "Digital Technology and the Copyright Act 1994 
Position Paper" (December 2002) <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 9 July 2004). 
12 The Directive was transformed into the national law of the United Kingdom by the 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (UK). 
13 The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty are 
collectively referred to as the "Internet Treaties" <http://www.wipo.org> (last accessed 9 
July 2004). 
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"safe harbours" limiting ISP liability for copyright infringement m the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 14 
The suggested amendment of the Copyright Act raises several issues and 
questions, which will be addressed in this paper. 
Most prominently, is there actual need for the proposed liability exemption, 
or will it be needed in the near future? Do the underlying policies give 
adequate justification for the suggested amendment? 
Even if the general proposition can be found to be appropriate, are the 
proposed statutory changes sufficient to serve the purposes identified by 
the MED, which are to foster both private and business use of the Internet, 
and to ensure protection of copyright in the digital age and provide for a 
balance between the opposing interests? 
The current proposal does not include recommendations for a formalised 
notice-and-takedown procedure for alleged copyright infringements. This 
may expose ISPs to another type of liability, namely liability to their 
subscribers for unwarranted blocking of material. Because ISPs usually 
owe a duty to host and transmit information to their subscribers under the 
Internet services contracts, blocking such content after receipt of an 
infringement notice might render them liable if the blocked content turns 
out to be non-infringing. Thus, in a copyright conflict ISPs sit in a highly 
uncomfortable position between the copyright owner and the alleged 
infringer, which has to be taken into account when addressing the issue. 
Their attempts to safeguard themselves against copyright infringement 
liability, for instance by excluding it 111 the service contracts, will 
necessarily be at the expense of subscribers. 
According to the proposal, I iability of ISPs for the conduct of their 
subscribers will partly rest on the knowledge of such conduct. The 
14 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 USC (1998) (DMCA). 
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required standard of knowledge will determine to which degree ISPs will 
be forced to exercise control over their systems. The Position Paper 
suggests a standard of constructive knowledge, which not only includes 
actual knowledge, but also knowledge of facts or circumstances from 
which a reasonable person would infer that infringement has happened. 
Since the liability requirements in New Zealand are already comparatively 
narrow, it is questionable if ISPs will actually be able to benefit from the 
suggested exemptions. For example, liability for secondary infringement 
requires at least constructive knowledge of the infringing act. Under this 
regime, ISPs who have constructive knowledge will never qualify for an 
exemption from liability. ISPs who do not have constructive knowledge 
are not liable in the first place, and thus do not need the benefit of an 
exemption from liability. 
This paper is going to argue that a liability exemption for ISPs does not 
strike a proper balance between the policies and interests that should be 
considered. Its justification is therefore questionable. ISP liability has not 
been an issue in New Zealand Courts so far. Neither does there appear to 
be a need for an ISP exemption, because of the comparatively narrow 
infringement provisions, nor should ISPs be overly afraid of potential 
liability. Therefore, New Zealand could do well without this law reform. 
This left aside, the suggested proposal causes more problems than it solves. 
The most crucial point in the whole discussion is the secondary liability 
issue, which is mainly governed by the relevant secondary infringement 
provisions and the concept of authorisation. What is already an uncertainty 
here, namely the relevant knowledge standard, will be even extended by 
the proposal. It especially fails to address the question how ISPs should 
react to infringement notices. A formalised notice-and-takedown 
procedure could provide for better copyright protection and reliable 
standards of care on the part of the ISPs. Under the current law as well as 
under the proposal, ISPs are left compromised, because they are in the 
unfavourable position to decide whether the hosted material is infringing or 
not. Apart from possible ways to abuse this system, ISPs risk to be held 
4 
liable either by the copyright owner or by their subscriber if they make a 
wrong call. The legislation fails to address this issue at all. 
Instead of curing the symptoms, the legislator should get at the root of the 
problems, which is the cluttered secondary infringement provisions and the 
nebulous concept of authorisation, which is the true reason for the legal 
uncertainty copyright owners and ISPs are facing these days. 
5 
II TYPES OF LIABILITY ISPS COULD POSSIBLY FACE 
In order to determine whether a change in the law is necessary, it is 
essential to establish what the situation under the current law is. Generally, 
ISPs could possibly face (A) primary or (B) secondary liability for 
copyright infringement under the present law. Although there are a variety 
of potential causes of action, a risk analysis (C) will reveal that liability 
will not be an issue in many cases. 
A Primary liability 
Copyright infringement occurs if a person engages in an act restricted 
under the Copyright Act without having a license. 15 The acts restricted by 
the Copyright Act are listed in Section 16, namely copying, issuing copies 
to the public, performing, playing or showing the work, broadcasting or 
including the work in a cable programme, or adapting the work.
16 
Among 
possible types of primary infringement in relation to ISPs, (1) copying, (2) 
broadcasting and inclusion in a cable programme service, and (3) joint 
tortfeasance are the most prominent and likely ones. 
I Copying 
Primary liability for copying may arise when ISPs store copyrighted 
material by any means. 17 Thus, caching and other forms of temporary 
storage may infringe upon copyright. 18 
There have been cases, in particular in the United States of America, in 
which ISPs were held liable based on the fact that copyrighted material was 
15 Copyright Act l 994 (NZ), s 29( I). 
16 Copyright Act, s 16. 
17 Copyright Act, s 2. 
18 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" [2000] NZLJ 180, 18 l. 
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stored on their systems. In Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena, 19 the 
defendant operated a bulletin board service. Frena allowed his subscribers 
to upload the plaintiff's pictures without their authorisation as well as the 
download of the files. Frena argued that he had not uploaded the pictures 
himself. However, his defence was rejected and he was held directly liable 
for copyright infringement. In Playboy Enterprises Inc v Hardenburgh 
lnc,20 the scenario was similar. In this case, the defendant even encouraged 
its subscribers by allowing free download in exchange for uploads. The 
defendant's employees checked uploaded content for pornography and 
potential copyright infringement. The Court held for Playboy and ruled 
that Hardenburgh was liable for direct infringement. 
In both cases, liability arose not only by the fact that the bulletin board 
operators provided the necessary technical means for infringement, but also 
by their encouragement of the subscribers' infringing conduct.21 
Consequently, in Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services lnc,22 the Court ruled in favour of the ISP in the 
absence of such endorsement or a volitional element on the part of the 
provider. 
2 Broadcasting and inclusion in a cable programme service 
The New Zealand Copyright Act offers a somewhat arbitrary distinction 
between the broadcast of a copyrighted work and its inclusion in a cable 
programme service. Both are restricted acts under New Zealand copyright 
law. Although similar in nature, the risk of primary liability for 
infringement differs significantly. However, it can be expected that the 
reform will abolish these differences. 
19 Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena 839 F Supp 1552 (MD Fla 1993). 
20 Playboy Enterprises Inc v Hardenburgh Inc 982 F Supp 503 (ND Ohio 1997). 
2 1 In a similar case the Court came to the same conclusion, see Sega Enterprises Ltd v 
MAPHIA [ 19941857 F Supp 679 (ND Cal) . 
22 Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc 907 F 
Supp I 361 (ND Cal 1995). 
7 
(a) Inclusion in a cable service programme 
Under section 16(f) copyright owners have the right to include the work in 
a cable programme. Section 4(1) defines that a cable service programme is 
a "transmission service where the transmission is (a) for the reception at 
two or more places, either simultaneously or at different times, in response 
to requests by different users; or (b) for presentation for the members of the 
public." However, pursuant to section 4(2), interactive telecommunication 
systems are excluded from cable programmes. Interactivity means 
reciprocal communication by transmitting and information through the 
means of the same system. Therefore, ISPs could face liability where they 
provide separable services without elements of interactivity. In the United 
Kingdom case The Shetland Times v Willis,
23 the Court distinguished the 
part where users could send in comments by e-mail from the rest of the 
website and held the operator liable for providing an infringing "cable 
programme service" under the relevant United Kingdom provision. 
Although commentators have suggested that this is technically 
unjustified,24 especially for ISPs offering the hosting of websites,
25 they 
may still be held liable, because the statute does not distinguish between 
the provider of the technical facilities and the provider of the content. 
However, the statute may already off er a solution to the problem. Section 
4(2)(e) excludes from the definition as a cable programme service "a 
transmission service that is ... run for persons providing broadcasting or 
cable programme services or providing programmes for such services." As 
Longdin suggests, this provision can be extended to the infrastructure 
provider and transmitter, thus releasing them from primary liability under 
the cable programme service provisions.
26 Maybe the Courts would adopt 
this interpretation in order to circumvent the bizarre outcome resulting 
from a strict application of the provisions. 
23 The Shetla11d Times v Willis [ 1997] EMLR 277 (OH). 
24 Clive Gringras "Copyright: Interim Interdict - Declarator sought that Headline 
Hypertext Link lo Web Site constitutes Copyright" ( 1997) 19(2) EIPR D49. 
25 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" (2000] NZU 180, 182. 
26 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" [2000] NZU 180, I 82. 
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(b) Broadcasting 
When it comes to wireless communication, the situation changes, because 
the wireless transmission obviously does not involve a cable and cannot be 
a "cable programme service". The broadcasting right is therefore a 
distinguishable exclusive right under the Copyright Act. 27 However, under 
s 3(3)(a), a person can only be held to broadcast if he or she has any 
responsibility for the contents of the broadcast. Therefore, providers of 
wireless services face a much lower risk of primary liability. 
(c) Communication to the public 
The MED has recognized the need to replace the illogical distinction 
between cable programme services and broadcasting by a technology-
neutral definition. The right of communication to the public would then 
encompass any kind of transmission (by any means or combination of 
communication technologies, or via interactive, on-demand services). This 
would also be one of the key changes to make the Copyright Act compliant 
with the WIPO Internet Treaties.28 The proposal would change liability 
issues under the broadcasting I cable programme law significantly, as will 
be described below.29 
27 Copyright Act, s l6(f). 
28 Ministry of Economic Development "Digital Technology and the Copyright Act 1994: 
Policy Recommendations - Cabinet Paper" ( 18 June 2003) para 19, available on the 
MED's website <www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 17 August 2004). 
29 See Part II C Risk analysis. 
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3 Joint tortfeasance 
Joint tortfeasance is a common law doctrine similar to the United States 
theory of contributory infringement.30 According to Scrutton LJ, persons 
are considered joint tortfeasors when "their respective shares in the 
. f h f d . " 31 commission of the tort are done m urt erance o a common es1gn . 
Because copyright infringement is often treated as a tort, the doctrine is 
also applicable in copyright law.32 This requirement is higher than under 
the comparable contributory infringement doctrine. Under United States 
law, contributory liability can be established if the defendant "induces, 
causes or materially contributes" to the infringing conduct of another "with 
knowledge of the infringing activity" .33 In the Internet context, the 
doctrine was applied to Napster, a provider of a peer-to-peer network, 
which enabled its users to share copyrighted music files.
34 
However, under 
New Zealand law, the threshold is much higher and demands that both 
f d · d · 35 tort easors are engage m a concerte action. Merely assisting by 
providing the means for copyright infringement would most likely be 
insufficient to hold an ISP liable as a joint tortfeasor.
36 
The argument 
made in Napster is conceptually more related to the authorisation doctrine. 
B Secondary liability 
Secondary liability under New Zealand law may arise out of (1) vicarious 
liability, out of (2) the special secondary liability provisions of the 
30 Paul Apathy "Napster and New Zealand: Authorisation under the Copyright Act 1994" 
2002 VU WLR 287, 315. Clive Elliott "Content on the Internet - the competing rights of 
control and access" (2002) 11 TLF 129 appears to be of the same opinion. 
31 The Koursk [ 1924] 140, 157 (CA) Scrutton U; Crystal Glass Industries v Alwinco 
Products [1986] RPC 259,268 (CA). 
32 Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay lmellectual Property in New Zealand ( 1 ed, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, 200 I), para 5.27. 
33 Gershwin Pub Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc 443 F 2d 1159, 1162 (CA NY 
1971). 
34 A & M Records Inc v Napster Inc 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir 200 l ). 
35 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Pie RPC 567, 607 (HL) Templeman 
LJ. 
36 Paul Apathy "Napster and New Zealand: Authorisation under the Copyright Act 1994" 
2002 YUWLR 287,291. 
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Copyright Act,37 or due to (3) "authorisation" of infringing conduct of a 
third party. 38 
1 Vicarious liability 
Under United States law, vicarious liability requires that the defendant had 
the right and ability to exercise control over the directly infringing party 
and had a financial interest in the activity.39 Under this doctrine, the 
operator of a swap meet was held liable for not preventing trade with 
pirated music tapes on their premises.4° Conversely, vicarious liability is 
much stricter under New Zealand law. Traditionally it was only applied in 
cases of employer/employee or principal/agent relationships. 41 However, 
the concept of agency in the context of vicarious liability was recently 
extended to unusual constellations such as foster parents acting as agents 
for the Crown.42 The main arguments for imposing vicarious liability in 
this case, which involved child abuse committed by the foster parents, were 
that the Crown was under a special statutory obligation to protect the child, 
and that it had increased the risk of sexual abuse by placing the child in a 
private home where it could not be monitored as fully as in a governmental 
institution.43 The Court was apparently heavily influenced by the 
undesirability of an outcome that would have left the child without 
compensation. Thus, it is unclear whether this case could be of particular 
importance with regard to vicarious liability of ISPs for copyright 
infringement, given that the doctrine was applied in a rather narrow sense 
in the past. 
37 Copyright Act, ss 35-39. 
38 Copyright Act, s 16(i). 
39 Shapiro Bernstein & Co v H L Green Co 316 F 2d 304 (2d Cir 1963). 
4° Fonovisa Inc v Cherry Auctions Inc 76 F 3d 259 (9th Cir I 996). 
41 The same can be said about the United Kingdom. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland 
NV v Expon Credits Guarantee Department [2000] I AC 486, 494 (HL). 
42 S v Attomev-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA). 
43 S v Attorney-General (2003) 3 NZLR 450,470 (CA) Blanchard J. 
II 
2 Secondary infringement provisions 
Sections 35 to 39 of the Copyright Act deal with secondary infringement. 
Potential liability for ISPs is extremely limited, because most of the 
provisions require that there is a physical object in which the infringing 
copy is embodied.44 Cases of digital copying are therefore out of the scope 
of most of those provisions. However, it is arguable that ISPs may be 
liable under section 37(2) if they can be said to "transmit the work by 
means of a telecommunications system". 
Nonetheless, secondary infringement always requires a certain degree of 
knowledge of the third party's infringing conduct. ISPs may ·be found 
liable if they "knew or had reason to believe"45 that they were, for example, 
distributing infringing copies. This test of constructive knowledge
46 
is 
objective and involves a standard of knowledge derived from "facts from 
which a reasonable person ... would arrive at the relevant belief."
47 
The 
standard of constructive knowledge under the secondary infringement 
provisions already poses the question of how an infringement notice may 
give the recipient a "reason to believe" that infringement has occurred. 
This issue will be discussed in detail below.
48 
3 Authorisation 
The authorisation of others to infringe copyright is considered an infringing 
act itself pursuant to section 16(i) Copyright Act. Although "authorisation" 
is dealt with in Section 16 among other forms of primary infringement, its 
44 For instance, section 36 Copyright Act reads: "Copyright in a work is infringed by a 
rerson who ... possesses ... an object that is ... an infringing copy of the work." 
5 For example, see section 37 Copyright Act. 
46 The differences between actual and constructive knowledge and their implications are 
analysed in detail below, see Part IV C I The knowledge standard. 
47 Raben Footwear Pry Ltd v PolyGram Records Inc ( 1996) 35 !PR 426 (FCA). 
48 See Part !I C 3 Hosting providers. 
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nature is much closer to concepts of secondary infringement. Frankel and 
McLay have characterised it as "copyright's unknown quality".49 
There have not been many cases that decided the meamng of the word 
"authorise" under the Act in New Zealand. One of the leading cases under 
the Copyright Act 1962 was Koolman, 50 where the operator of a coffee bar 
was held to have authorised the public performance of copyrighted music 
played by a band, for which he received an admission fee. English Courts 
have interpreted authorisation as "sanction, approve or countenance".51 
However, authorisation does not have to amount to "condoning".52 It is 
generally held that the authoriser has to have a certain degree of control 
over the infringing conduct or over the facilities used for infringement.53 
One of the leading decisions in the technology field is University of New 
South Wales v Moorhouse. 54 It involved the provision of self-service 
photocopying machines in the University library. The Australian High 
Court stated:55 
A person that has under his control the means by which an 
infringement may be committed and who makes it available to 
other persons, knowing, or having reason to suspect, that it is 
likely to be used for the purpose of commilling an infringement, 
and omitting to take reasonable steps to limit the use to legitimate 
purposes, would authorise any infringement that resulted from its 
use. 
However, this definition is contrasted by the statement made by Lord 
Templeman in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Ltd, 
"authorisation means a grant or purported grant, which may be express or 
49 Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay Intellectual Property in New Zealand (led, LexisNexis 
Bullerworths, Wellington , 2001), para 5.11.7. 
50 Australasian Performillg Right Association Limited v Koolman and Another [1969) 
NZLR 273. 
51 Falcon v Famous Players Film Co [1926] 2 KB 474. 
52 CBS Sollgs Ltd v Amstrad Pie [ 1988) AC 1013, I 055 (HL); Amstrad Computer 
Electronics Pie v British Phonographic Industry Ltd [1986] FSR 159,207 (UKCA). 
51 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" (2000] NZU 180, 183. 
q University of New Sowh Wales v Moorhouse [ 1976] RPC 151, 157 (HCA). 
" University of New Sowh Wales v Moorhouse [ 1976] RPC 151, 157 (HCA) Gibbs J. 
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implied, of the right to do the act complained about."
56 
A similar 
reasoning, however in the context of the United States rule of contributory 
liability, was made by the Court in Sony Corporation of America v 
Universal City Studios Inc:
57 
The sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute 
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for 
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
In his examination of these cases in respect to their applicability to New 
Zealand law, Apathy suggested that the approach taken in Amstrad 
appeared to be "much closer to the correct interpretation of 'authorise' than 
Moorhouse."58 According to his analysis, authorisation amounts to a 
misrepresentation of the right to a work, thereby leading others to infringe. 
This is in line with the interpretation of authorisation given in the recent 
Canadian case CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada.
59 
Like 
Moorhouse, the case involved photocopying machines that were 
maintained by the Law Society and made available for use to the visitors of 
the Law Society's library. In CCH, the Court ruled that the Moorhouse 
approach was inconsistent with the concepts of authorisation under British 
and Canadian Jaw. McLachlin CJ wrote:
60 
In my view, the Moorhouse approach to authorization shifts the 
balance in copyright too far in favour of the owner's rights and 
unnecessarily interferes with the proper use of copyrighted works 
for the good of society as a whole. 
She concluded that the Law Society did not have sufficient control over the 
conduct of its patrons to say that it "sanctioned, approved or countenanced 
56 CBS Songs Ltd v A111strad Consumer Elec1ro11ics Pie RPC 567, 604 (HL) Templeman 
LI. 
57 Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios Inc 104 S Ct 774, 785. 
58 Paul Apathy "Napster and New Zealand: Authorisation under the Copyright Act 1994" 
2002 VUWLR 287,315. 
59 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (2004) CarswellNat 446 (CSC). 
60 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (2004) CarswellNat 446, para 41 
(CSC) McLachlin CJ. 
14 
the infringement". 61 This was mainly because the relationship between the 
library and its patrons was not like a master/servant or employer/employee 
relationship and because the library did not have any control over the 
works the clients chose to copy. Because the New Zealand authorisation 
provision is similar to the Canadian one,62 this case is of particular 
importance to the position in New Zealand. Without doubt this 
understanding of the concept of authorisation is advantageous for ISPs, 
because an "expansive interpretation would severely handicap Internet 
service providers" .63 
C Risk analysis 
Potential liability for ISPs under current New Zealand law can arise out of 
a number of sources. Although ISPs may be overly risk-adverse, an 
assessment reveals that in reality the dangers of liability are smaller then 
generally assumed. The risks may also vary depending on the role of the 
ISP in respect to the infringing conduct of a subscriber. 
1 Content providers 
ISPs that make infringing material available on the Internet themselves will 
be held liable just as any other direct infringer. In cases where the ISP is 
responsible for the content it publishes on its web sites, there are no 
significant differences to other forms of direct infringement. Consequently 
they should not be treated differently, and the Position Paper does not 
suggest a liability exception for such activities. 
61 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada (2004) CarswellNat 446, para 45 
(CSC) McLachlin CJ. 
62 Copyright Act RSC 1985 (Canada), c C-42. 
63 Susy Frankel and Geoff Mc Lay lntellecwal Property in New Zealand ( led, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2001), para 5.1 l.7(c). 
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2 Access providers 
The majority of ISPs offer access to the Internet, either solely or together 
with other services such as hosting. Subscribers can hook up their 
computers to the provider's network, which is directly connected to the 
Internet, thus enabling the subscriber to browse web sites. The necessary 
transmissions between the subscriber's computer and the servers hosting 
the web sites occur through the ISP' s system. 
Under the current law, the chances of being held liable for merely 
providing access to the Internet are rather small. Secondary infringement 
is usually out of question, because ISPs will usually lack the required 
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement. They will usually 
have no "reason to believe" that they are distributing infringing copies, 
because the relevant knowledge test requires more than a suspicion that 
. f . 64 m nngement occurs. The sheer amount of transmitted data makes it 
unfeasible for access providers to monitor their systems, especially because 
the transmission occurs within a few seconds, which is certainly not 
sufficient to decide on such a multi-facetted legal question as copyright 
infringement. Moreover, it would be rather absurd to argue that the ISP 
had "authorised" the infringement in the absence of any knowledge. 
An ISP that merely acts as a conduit to the Internet will not be found 
directly liable for distributing infringing copies in the absence of any 
additional volitional or knowledge elements, as in the bulletin board 
operator cases . A more realistic danger could arise under the cable service 
programme provisions, because the scope of these provisions is not entirely 
clear. This is however a general issue of defective legislature. It would be 
a reasonable reaction of the Courts to refuse the application of these 
provisions in respect to ISPs, who might as well be able to argue that they 
run their services "for persons providing broadcasting or cable programme 
services", thus releasing them from liability under the statute itself. 
6~ LA Gear Inc v High -Tech Sports Pie [ I 992) FSR 121 , 129 (EWHC) Morrill J. 
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A separate issue that could cause liability is the transitory storage of 
information, commonly referred to as "caching". The MED considers that 
the current definition of copying is broad enough to include temporary 
storage of information, for instance in a computer's Random Access 
Memory (RAM).65 
These issues appear to be properly addressed by the proposal. The 
proposed communication right resolves the absurd distinction between 
cable and wireless services. Furthermore, under the proposed clarification 
that the mere provision of physical facilities shall not attract liability, 
access providers should not be worried of potential liability.66 
3 Hosting providers 
Providers who offer to host a subscriber's web site on their servers are 
probably in the greatest danger of being held liable. In respect to primary 
liability, their situation is not significantly different from the one of access 
providers . Liability for inclusion of copyrighted works in cable 
programme services is the same issue as with access providers. Neither 
will primary liability for copying be a concern if there are no volitional 
elements as in the Playboy cases discussed above.67 
Authorisation requires that ISPs act as if they had the right to permit the 
use of a copyright work, which will hardly be found in most cases, 
provided that New Zealand Courts will reject the argument made in 
Moorhouse. Due to the nature of the hosting service, an ISP may be more 
likely to have actual or constructive knowledge of subscriber's infringing 
actions. However, ISPs might be able to argue that they neither have actual 
knowledge nor reason to believe that the material uploaded by their 
65 Position Paper, para 45. 
66 See also Part IV A Regarding primary liability. 
67 See Part II Al Copying. 
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subscribers infringes, due to their large number and the technical 
impossibility to monitor all uploaded material. As Longdin pointed out, 
ISPs should be treated at least as leniently as swap meet operators who are 
generally aware of the fact that copyright infringement might occur on their 
premises.68 It is one of the features of swap meets and ISPs that 
somewhere or somehow infringement may occur. This is nothing more 
than common knowledge. Such general awareness could however convert 
to constructive knowledge after receipt of an infringement notice.
69 The 
interpretation of authorisation in Moorhouse would pose a certain risk of 
liability on ISPs. However, the more lenient approach of Amstrad and 
CCH seems to be the likelier one to be adopted by Courts, because it 
strikes a reasonable balance between copyright owners' interests and the 
public interest of availability of useful facilities like the Internet or 
photocopy machines. 
The situation may change when ISPs are actually notified by copyright 
owners of alleged infringement. It is likely that they will then be found to 
have had at least reason to believe that there is infringing material hosted 
on their servers, although there is no automatism between receipt of an 
infringement notice and the inference of knowledge. As pointed out above, 
ISPs would have to determine and confirm the alleged copyright 
infringement, which is a legal issue that can be delegated to out-of-house 
counsel. In any case, it gives ISPs time to react to such notice and either 
remove access to the material or decide to bear the risk of liability, leaving 
it in the hand of the providers to minimise the risk of liability . In view of 
the comparatively narrow provisions, and because the "judiciary's 
reluctance to expand the protections afforded by copyright without explicit 
legislative guidance",
70 the liability risk can probably be characterised as 
manageable. Out-of-house counsel can furthermore function as a means of 
risk management, because erroneous advice given by lawyers will attract 
professional liability on their part. 
68 Loui se Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" (2000] NZU 180, 183. 
69 See Part lY C I The knowledge standard. 
70 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Crokster Ltd [20031259 F Supp 2d 1029, 1046 
(DC Cal). 
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III IS A SECONDARY LIABILITY EXEMPTION JUSTIFIABLE? 
It cannot be doubted that the risk of potential liability influences the way a 
person acts, in particular in business. Liability has always been the legal 
response to increased risks and potentially dangerous acts. There can be 
also no doubt that the Internet, with its decentralised structure, the 
immanent anonymity , and its incredible potential to reproduce digital 
information, poses an imminent risk to the rights of the makers of creative 
works. The damages suffered by these creators and by the industry based 
on their works are immense, and due to the problems encountered in 
holding the primary infringers liable, copyright is becoming more and more 
a right without proper enforcement mechanisms in the digital environment. 
Thus, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to respond to such a threat 
with exempting those from liability who are perhaps in the best position to 
combat it. 
There are several ways to deal with the problem. There is the possibility of 
holding the one who facilitates the infringement accountable. This is, to 
the extent outlined above, the position in New Zealand under current law. 
There is also the possibility of letting copyright owners incur damages 
without providing a remedy . That is what the Position Paper proposes. 
Exempting ISPs from liability means that copyright owners will not have 
effective tools available to stop infringement. Primary infringement action, 
even if the identity of the infringer is discovered, will only provide a 
solution for an individual infringement case. It will not stop infringement 
from happening in the future through the means of other ISPs. With 
hosting services available at a few mouse-clicks, it takes virtually no time 
to set up the same website on another server. Access to the Internet is no 
longer reserved to a skilled technologic elite. Bearing this in mind, it must 
be also clear that notice-and-takedown procedures will never be able to 
provide a full solution to the problem without implementing protective 
mechanisms. 
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The persons in the relatively best position to exercise control are the ones 
who provide access to the Internet and offer hosting services. Thus, the 
idea that Internet Service Providers should be held liable arises from the 
observation that "copyright infringement is a very serious problem that 
needs to be stamped out ruthlessly".7 1 Internet Service Providers control 
the means through which infringement occurs. However, it would be a 
crude misunderstanding of the Internet as a medium to put the blame on 
Internet Service Providers for merely providing the communication 
structures that facilitate infringement. Likewise, it would be absurd to hold 
a telephone company accountable for infringement occurring through their 
telephone lines. This argument though, however often made, is convincing 
only in respect to access providers. Hosting services are of a different 
nature. An access provider only provides the admission to material that 
already exists in cyberspace. The material would be accessible anywhere 
in the world, no matter whether the particular provider enables its 
subscribers to access it. Thus, the standard of protection for copyright 
owners would not be improved by imposing liability on such access 
providers . However, targeting the provider who hosts the material can, at 
least temporarily, stop the infringement, because it could provide for 
removal of the infringing material from the Internet. Therefore a host 
provider is not comparable to a telephone company, because hosting 
services are a prerequisite for making infringing material available. 
This difference alone, however, would not be sufficient to justify liability. 
The reason for responsibility need not necessarily be based on fault. 
Tortuous liability does not always require a wrongdoing, but it may also be 
based on the performance of a risky action. A car owner may be liable for 
the damage caused by the operation of the automobile. A dog owner may 
be liable for damages caused by the animal. Vicarious liability is imposed 
to employers for the conduct of their employees; principals may be liable 
7 1 Alfred C Yen " Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright 
Infringement, Enterpri se Liability, and the First Amendment" (2000) 88 GEOLJ 1833, 
1892. 
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for the acts of their agents.72 One could easily think of more such cases, 
and the reason for liability is not fault, but the participation in a risk. 
However, law imposes liability only when the risk is disproportional to the 
average risk that every member of society has to bear. It imposes liability 
on those who participate in this risk and who benefit from it. It is 
important to note that liability is not meant as a punishment or deterrent in 
such cases. It is rather the price that is paid for the benefits connected to 
the risk. As a result, everyone has the choice to continue or to cease from 
participating in the risk. The decision will largely depend on the relation 
between the likelihood and the amount of damage or benefits that can be 
expected from the performance of the risky act. Liability thus strikes a 
balance between the benefits and the risks. If the relation is roughly in 
balance, liability, or, more precisely, potential liability will neither 
encourage unnecessary risky conduct nor deter risky conduct entirely. 
Internet in New Zealand is still booming.73 As the MED claims, New 
Zealanders are enthusiastic about using the Internet, and thus, the number 
of subscriptions is continuingly increasing. One must assume that New 
Zealand ISPs have done their homework and calculated the risk of potential 
liability. It cannot be doubted that the result is already a factor in the 
calculation of access and hosting fees. The factor may not be as great as 
for instance in the United States, due to the comparatively limited liability 
law as outlined above, but it is certainly part of the calculation. Therefore, 
it is hard to argue that liability acts as a deterrent to Internet use on the one 
hand if the statistics tell the opposite, and one can only conclude that the 
balance between liability risks and benefits is properly struck. Thus, the 
72 It is true, though, that strict liability is not the most prominent feature of New Zealand's 
legal system. 
73 According to a study conducted by the research company JDC, the number of Internet 
users climbed from 2.14 million in 2001 to 2.5 million people in 2004. Cited in Richard 
Pamatatua "Internet Shake-out'' (200 I) 2 NZ INFOTECH WEEKLY 7. According to an 
international study conducted in 200 I, New Zealand users are among the most active users 
of the web. Cited in "Kiwis among highest users of Internet" (29 May 200 I) 
Compwerworld. The statistics compiled by lnremer World Stars indicate that 55.4 per 
cent of New Zealand's population has Internet access, which puts New Zealand in 13th 
place worldwide. See <http://www.internetworldstats.com/top25.htm>. 
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main argument for the introduction of secondary liability exemption 
appears to be contradicted by reality . 
What would happen if the risk of liability increased? It is likely that, in a 
first step, ISPs would indeed raise connection and hosting fees. It is 
equally likely that ISPs would think of ways to prevent secondary liability 
by targeting the problem at its roots. A few examples show how ISPs dealt 
with the problem of potential liability without the ability to resort to a 
liability exemption clause. The Finnish group of the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and a number of Finnish 
ISPs came to an agreement upon the prevention of intellectual property 
rights infringements.74 Under this agreement, ISPs have to block content 
and reveal the identity of the content provider upon infringement 
notification by IFPI. Upon repeated infractions, ISPs have to terminate its 
relations with the customer. In exchange, IFPI waives any liability claims 
and indemnifies the ISP for damages incurred because of invalid 
notification. In Argentina, a similar approach was taken in negotiations 
between the Argentine Industry Association of Record and Music Video 
Producers (CAPIF) and the Argentine Chamber of Data Bases (CABASE), 
which comprised several ISPs . Upon notification of alleged infringement, 
the ISP hosting the website would have five days to justify or remove the 
content. If the ISP failed to remove the content, a commission would be 
formed consisting of CAPIF and CABASE representatives. Only if the 
commission could not resolve the conflict the parties would be allowed to 
bring legal proceedings.75 
If there was not a potential for liability, there would not be a great need to 
find mutual ways to resolve the interest conflicts between copyright owners 
and ISPs . The risk of being held accountable creates an incentive to enter 
negotiations. This risk forces ISPs to take responsibility not only in terms 
74 Nils Bortloff and Janet I !enderson " WIPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability: 
Notice and Take-Down Agreements in Practice in Europe" 7 <www.wipo.org> (last 
accessed 22 July 2004). 
75 Ni ls Bortloff and Janet Henderson " WJPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability: 
Notice and Take-Down Agreements in Practice in Europe" 9 <www.wipo.org> (last 
accessed 22 July 2004) . 
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of compensation of damages incurred, but also in terms of prevention of 
such damages. There are technological means to prevent online copyright 
infringement to a certain extent. The Rights Protection System (RPS) is a 
technology that analyses the transmitted data and scans for unlawful 
content. If such content is found, the respective URL 76 is blocked.77 
Docking at the ISP' s routers,78 the system filters the respective websites 
and makes them inaccessible for any clients connected through those 
routers. Approaches like the RPS and related systems need the cooperation 
of ISPs to work. If ISPs do not implement such technology, the prevention 
of copyright infringement is impossible. Because ISPs control the 
facilities, they are in the position to adopt protective mechanisms. If the 
risk of being held accountable is significantly reduced, ISPs do not have 
any incentive to act. This would lead copyright owners incurring damages 
without having any factual power to prevent such damages in the future. 
The justification for this result is the policy of ensuring cost-effective 
access to the Internet. However, effective protection of copyright, in light 
of a threat that appears to be greater than the invention of the letterpress, is 
a policy that is not sufficiently considered in respect to the proposed 
legislation. The reason for the existence of copyright in the common law 
system was the "encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of 
printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies. "79 The legal 
protection provides the incentive to produce creative works. If the scope of 
this legal protection is so narrow that the enforcement of rights cannot be 
maintained in the digital age, this could in fact be a deterrent for future 
works and lead to the frustration of authors and the related industries. 
Electronic commerce, including the offering of digitised works, would 
become a particular risk and have a chilling effect on New Zealand's 
76 The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is the standardised address to access sources on 
the Internet. 
77 This is the so called "black listing" model where access to specified sites is blocked. 
Another way is the "white listing" model, where access is only possible lo listed sites. See 
also Rosa Julia-Barcelo "Liability for On-Line Intermediaries: A European Perspective" 
(1998) EIPR 20(12) 453. 
78 A router is a network device that forwards data packets lo the next point of the network. 
It is essential for the operation of decentralised networks such as the Internet. 
79 British Statutes ( 1709) 8 Anne, eh XIX. 
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Internet economy. Thus, it is inevitable that any reform strikes a proper 
balance between the opposing interests. While the suggested clarifications 
as to primary liability are useful and take both sides into account, it appears 
not to be sufficiently regarded with respect to the secondary liability 
exemptions. There are other policy considerations which ought to be 
considered in this argument. 
For instance, a policy worth considering could be the idea of spreading the 
losses. This is not unknown in New Zealand. For instance, section 14 of 
the Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 bars claims for 
personal injuries. Victims of personal injuries are compensated by a fund 
financed by employers, earners, motorists and the government. The idea of 
spreading the losses among virtually the whole society appears to be 
justified in this case, because every member of the society participates in 
the risk of injuring someone else, while the victims are often left with 
insufficient legal remedies. Thus, the objective of the introduction of this 
alternative form of compensation was not the responsibility for the loss, but 
to cater for the needs.80 Because of the nature of a fault-based tortuous 
liability, in the majority of cases those needs were not met appropriately.
81 
Therefore, legislation took a different path in addressing the issue. 
However, the idea of spreading the losses among society is not only limited 
to such exceptional liability models. Tortuous liability for potentially risky 
behaviour has always worked as a way to spread the losses. Before the 
introduction of the accident compensation scheme, mandatory insurance 
for car owners already served a similar purpose. Because the victims used 
to have difficulties both in obtaining a judgment (because of the need to 
prove fault) and in collecting damages (because many defendants are 
financially unable to pay for large amounts of damages out of their own 
pockets), mandatory insurance provided care for the victims' needs. 
80 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts i11 New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 
para 1.4. 
1 Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 
para 1.4. 
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In many respects, the situation of copyright owners is similar to this 
situation. Obviously, suffering personal injury and the mere breach of a 
right are not comparable in its effects.82 In both cases, an unlawful 
violation causes damages, for which adequate compensation is not 
available. While it is true that the situations are incomparable in their 
practical impacts, and that it would demean the victim of a car accident to 
compare them with an artist whose copyright is infringed upon, they have 
something in common. The common feature of rights, no matter if it is as 
essential as physical integrity or as luxurious as an intellectual property 
right, is that they require efficient legal protection. If the extent of this 
legal protection is not sufficient to offer a redress to victims for the loss of 
their rights or to allow enforcement of the right, the right is in danger of 
becoming meaningless. With such a widespread medium as the Internet, 
intellectual property rights, in particular, copyright is in permanent danger. 
Therefore, it would follow a similar doctrinal approach to hold the ones 
accountable who take part in creating this danger. The expected increase 
of fees will therefore put the burden on the shoulders of all Internet users. 
This would also provide copyright owners with potentially more solvent 
defendants. Primary infringers often tum out to be incapable of 
reimbursing copyright owners for the huge damages incurred. The reason 
for this is that it is possible to cause enormous harm without a need for 
particularly great financial resources. ISPs, however, are much more 
convenient defendants if found liable. Especially larger ISPs create solid 
revenues through their services. Moreover, liability will almost certainly 
be covered by insurance companies rather than actually be paid at the ISP' s 
expense, since insurance coverage is much more likely within a company 
doing business than with a private person. Thus, the insurance premiums 
will be part of the ISPs' fee calculation and ultimately be paid by the 
82 A point could also be made that copyright is a legally created right. Although other 
jurisdictions certainly emphasise the moral aspects of copyright stronger, a discussion 
between legal positivism and natural law theories is clearly out of the scope of this paper, 
and it should be noted that all rights, including the right to physical integrity, ultimately 
exist by virtue of law. 
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subscribers. This effect would again amount to spreading the losses caused 
by the side-effects of the Internet's great merits. 
New Zealand Courts have yet to deal with ISP liability issues. There has 
not been a single lawsuit involving ISPs and secondary copyright 
infringement rules in New Zealand until today. Therefore, it appears to be 
legitimate to ask how exactly a change of the law can be justified. A 
statutory change of law may be warranted if it responds to a development 
in case law that is unwanted. However, if the problem has not been severe 
enough to generate at least one judgment in this field, it is hard to defend 
legislation. The confusion about ISP liability results mostly from the 
assumption that overseas case law, predominantly of the United States, 
displays a problem that exists to the same extent in New Zealand. This is, 
due to the different law as outlined above, not the case. Moreover, legal 
confusion is often a prerequisite to the development of coherent case law. 
A clear definition of rules, should the issue ever arise, is what one should 
expect from New Zealand Courts. One should be content that clear, 
narrow rules will be found if Courts "closely analyse the nature of online 
conduct".83 
It would be a legitimate question to ask whether New Zealand should 
refrain from adopting a position that has become the law in many western 
jurisdictions, among which are the most important economies like the 
United States or the European Community. Indeed, there does not seem to 
be an easy answer available. However, the development of the secondary 
liability exemptions has to be considered in their historical development. 
The development in the United States in particular has not been a steady 
one. Cases such as Netcom did not exactly suggest that ISP liability could 
become a major issue in the United States. It would have been arguable, 
and it was argued,
84 that the legislator should have left it to the Courts to 
83 Ian C Ballon "Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for 
Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occuring over 
the Internet" ( 1996) 18 COMENT 729,766. 
84 Alfred C Yen "Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright 
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment" (2000) 88 GEOU 1833. 
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develop a coherent system of liability within the frame of tort law and the 
existing statutes. Some legal uncertainty would have been the negative 
consequence for the consistent development of the law. Before the DMCA 
was passed, an expert commission of the Clinton administration in fact 
argued in favour of the principle possibility that primary and secondary 
liability could be imposed on ISPs in a publication that became known as 
the White Paper. 85 However, this did not remain the predominant view of 
the legislator, which is why the DMCA came into effect. 
The European Community was influenced by the development in the 
United States when it passed the Electronic Commerce Directive.86 The 
introduction of the ISP exemption is therefore not automatically 
attributable to legal necessity, but to the pressure imposed by the United 
States on the European Internet economy. This mechanism is 
understandable alone because of the competition between both economies. 
However, New Zealand's economy is on a much smaller scale. New 
Zealand's ISPs are for the largest part not subject to international 
competition.87 Additionally, New Zealand's law is quite different. As 
shown above, the secondary infringement provisions and the concept of 
authorisation are very different from the law in the United States. In their 
comparative studies, commentators have argued that even a case like 
Napster, which could be characterised as a rather obvious case of 
secondary liability in the United States, would not apply to New Zealand. 
In the case of the European Community, the Electronic Commerce 
Directive did not only serve the purpose of favouring a certain legal 
approach towards ISP liability, but also to unify the law in the member 
states and lower the barriers to trade, which is a reason why it does not 
85 Bruce A Lehmann Intellectual Property and the National !11for111ation !nfrastruclllre -
The Report of tlze Working Croup on lntellect11al Property Rights ( 1995) I 14-124. 
86 Bill Thompson "Damn the Constitution: Europe must lake back the Web" (2002) 
<http://www. theregister .co. uk>. 
87 The only internationally operating ISP listed on Yahoo's Small Business Directory is 
the New Zealand branch of AT&T. See also the list on 
<http://www.newzealandisp.orcon.net. nz>. 
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apply to New Zealand. In summary, the differences in terms of economy 
and copyright law justify that New Zealand goes its own way. 
28 
IV THE POSITION PAPER'S PROPOSALS 
In the previous section it was argued that a general exemption for ISPs is 
neither necessary nor based on a balanced policy consideration. Even if 
one generally accepted the proposition that the current law is not 
appropriate to deal with the situation of ISPs, it can be doubted whether the 
proposed solutions of the Position Paper provide the best answer. While 
the suggestions regarding the (A) definition of ISPs and (B) primary 
liability appear to be quite a constructive amendment of the law, the 
provisions regarding (C) secondary liability especially and their impact on 
the liability law deserve a closer examination. 
A Definition of ISPs 
While New Zealand copyright law is entirely governed by the Copyright 
Act, the suggested exemptions are a special provision that exclusively 
target the issues related to the various forms of provision of Internet-related 
services. Because the term "Internet Service Provider" covers a broad 
range of entities, definition becomes an issue to determine which entities 
should be eligible for the exemption. The Position Paper proposes a 
definition based on the nature of the activity. 88 The secondary 
infringement provision deals primarily with ISPs who host information at 
the direction of third party subscribers . Contrary to transient copying and 
caching, hosting is an activity that goes beyond providing a mere access to 
the Internet itself by requiring a higher degree of participation by ISPs . By 
hosting subscriber's websites, ISPs make storage space on their servers 
available to third parties. The MED proposes that the definition of ISPs 
should be broad enough to cover entities, which are not generally 
considered to be ISPs, if they provide ISP services. The definition of ISPs 
as proposed by the MED would also provide for future developments. It 
88 Position Paper, para 81. 
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could easily cater to new technologies such as WLAN
89 or UMTS,
90 
because the definitions focus on the nature of the activity rather than on a 
formal status, and because the distinction between cable and wireless 
communication would be abolished. 
B Regarding primary liability 
The Position Paper addresses several issues in respect to potential primary 
liability for copyright infringement that could have an impact on the legal 
situation of ISPs. 
1 Transient copying and the reproduction right 
The current reproduction right under the Copyright Act includes the right 
to control digital copies of the work. The MED, in accordance with the 
majority of submissions made on the Discussion Paper, proposes to restrict 
that right if transient copying is part of an automated technical process and 
is intended to provide for an act otherwise permitted.
91 If copying serves 
this purpose, according to the MED the reproduction right is not 
significantly restricted, since it does not encourage the creation of new 
works.92 The Ministry therefore suggests an exception directed towards 
transient copies.93 Although it is likely that this exception will cover 
caching, the MED proposes an ·additional exception for the "common 
89 Wireless local access networks (WLAN) use radio waves as carriers and are considered 
an alternative to cabled networks. It is expected that large future markets of WLAN lie in 
office environments and in the health sector. See also <www .wlan.org> (last accessed 20 
July 2004). 
90 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a third generation mobile 
telephony standard. Its broadband capabilities make it an ideal carrier for large amounts 
of data and internet applications. See also <www.umtsworld.com> (last accessed 20 July 
2004). 
91 Position Paper, para 46. 
92 Position Paper, para 47. 
93 Position Paper, para 49. 
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practice" of caching.94 The Position Paper suggests that the exception 
clause should be modelled on the equivalent United Kingdom provision.95 
Regulation 18 of the UK Electronic Commerce Regulations provides that a 
service provider is exempted from liability if it does not modify the 
information, complies with conditions on access to the information and 
with any rules regarding the updating of the information, does not interfere 
with lawful use of technology to obtain data on use of the information, and 
acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to such information upon 
obtaining knowledge of the removal of the initial source of the 
transmission.96 
2 Mere provision of physical facilities 
The MED suggests an amendment of the Copyright Act stating that the 
"mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication does not itself constitute an infringement of copyright, or 
an authorisation for such infringement."97 This is modelled on a similar 
provision of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.98 The Canadian Supreme Court 
argued in Canadian Association of Internet Providers v Society of 
Composers and Music Publishers99 that as long as the role of the ISP was 
limited to providing the "means necessary to allow data initiated by other 
persons to be transmitted over the Internet", it would act as a "mere 
conduit". 100 It would however go beyond such content-neutral provision of 
94 Position Paper, para 85. 
95 Position Paper, para 86. 
96 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (UK), reg 18. 
97 Position Paper, para 84. 
98 WCT, art 8 Agreed Statement 
99 Canadian Association of Internet Providers v Society of Composers, Awhors and Music 
Publishers (2004) SCC 45 (CSC). 
100 Canadian Association of Internet Providers v Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers (2004) SCC 45, para 95 (CSC) Binnie J. 
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physical facilities if an ISP has notice of infringing conduct and fails to 
respond by taking the material down.
101 
3 Analysis 
The Position Paper addresses some of the crucial issues regarding possible 
liability for primary infringement, in particular transient copying and 
caching. Although legally independent forms of infringement, they cannot 
be separated from the essential functions of the Internet and have been 
characterised as the "digital equivalent to the right to read", as far as the 
technically necessary storage of information in the RAM is coricerned.
102 
The aspects of caching are slightly different from transient copying, 
because of the longer duration of the storage and because caching is not 
indispensable to the functioning of the Internet (while the storage of 
information in the RAM is an inevitable step to execute a program or view 
a web site). The MED argues that caching of frequently accessed websites 
makes access to Internet material more efficient and thus, more cost-
effective.103 Moreover, the current law would give copyright owners an 
unduly broad right, which could tum out to be a disincentive to Internet 
104 use. The policy of endorsing fast, cost-effective usage of the Internet 
should prevail here over the interests of copyright owners. Transient 
copies are not of great economical importance for copyright owners. In 
reality, transient copying does not amount to a duplication of the, because 
from an Internet user's point of view it does not matter whether the copy 
actually originates from the original website or from the ISP' s cache. In its 
effects, caching does nothing more than increasing the Internet's operation 
speed. This is something that copyright owners also have an interest in, 
because it enables them to distribute their works over the Internet. 
101 Canadian Association of buemet Providers v Society of Composers, Allllzors and 
Music Publishers (2004) SCC 45, para 127 (CSC) Binnie J. 
102 Position Paper, para 45 . 
103 Position Paper, para 86. 
104 Position Paper, para 47. 
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Therefore, the limitation of the reproduction right cannot be expected to 
harm copyright owners or diminish their incentive to produce creative 
works and make them available on the Internet. 
The proposed regulations also provide for clarity regarding the crucial 
primary liability issues addressed above. Primary liability for copying is 
practically ruled out under the new regime, with the noteworthy exception 
of the special bulletin board cases . In these cases, liability was justified on 
the basis of an additional, volitional element on part of the operators, who 
effectively supported and endorsed the infringing conduct of their 
subscribers. This justification for primary liability would likely apply 
under the proposed changes of the law. 
ISPs will not face liability as cable programme service providers or 
broadcasters, especially if the unwarranted distinction will be replaced by a 
technology-neutral definition. The proposed clarification that the mere 
provision of facilities does not amount to primary infringement, will 
effectively release ISPs from any kind of potential liability, provided the 
ISP has no control over the content of the transmission. 
C Regarding secondary liability 
ISPs should usually not face primary liability, and the above-mentioned 
suggestions certainly provide a bridge where the law has previously left 
gaps. However, as described above, the situation with respect to secondary 
liability is not as clear. Instead of changing the general rules governing 
secondary liability, that is the secondary infringement and the authorisation 
provisions in the Copyright Act, the MED suggests introducing an 
exception of the general rule. The suggested statutory exemption is tailored 
after the EC Directive. According to the Directive, as transfonned into 
national law in the UK, ISPs are exempt from liability, where 
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a. The service provider does not have actual knowledge of 
unlawful activity or information; or, where a claim for 
damages is made, the service provider is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which it would have been 
apparent to the service provider that the activity or 
information was unlawful ; 
b. Upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, the 
service provider acts expeditiously to remove or disable 
access to the information ; and 
c. The third party subscriber was not acting under the 
authority or the control of the service provider. 
As far as the knowledge requirement 1s concerned, the MED suggests 
applying the "constructive knowledge" standard, because this is consistent 
with the existing secondary liability provisions.
105 A possible wording for 
subsection (a) could therefore be: 
a. The service provider does not know or has reason to 
know of unlawful activity or information; 
While the proposal seems to be reasonable and balanced in respect to 
primary liability issues, the same cannot be said of the suggested changes 
of the secondary liability law. The proposal has several implications in 
relation to ISPs and copyright owners. While the provisions governing 
secondary infringement and authorisation remain unchanged, the proposal 
tries to reverse the unwanted results generated by the statutory mess. 
While this can be criticised from a doctrinal point of view, the prominent 
features of the exemption clauses, in particular the knowledge standard 
(A), in connection with the infringement notice factor (B), are also going to 
cause or maintain a wide range of vagueness and unaddressed practical 
problems. 
105 Position Paper, para 93. 
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1 The knowledge standard 
Under the proposed amendment of the Copyright Act, ISPs will only be 
able to avoid liability if they do not have constructive knowledge of the 
infringement. 
Constructive knowledge commonly refers to facts from which a reasonable 
person in the same position as the ISP would infer that copyright 
infringement has occurred. This encompasses a party that "wilfully closes 
its eyes to the obvious and wilfully fails to make those inquiries that an 
honest and reasonable person in the circumstances would have made" .106 
To establish a lack of knowledge, the defendant would have to show 
"subjective lack of awareness that the act constituting the infringement was 
an infringement of copyright; and that, objectively assessed, the respondent 
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the act constituted an 
infringement of copyright". 107 
This objective test is contrasted by the actual knowledge standard, which 
was adopted in the EC Directive. Actual knowledge means subjective 
knowledge of the defendant as well as knowledge of facts. It is not a 
requirement that the defendant draws the correct conclusions from those 
f . . l . d .: 10s acts, Just as an error m aw 1s no e1ence. As Harvey J put it, 
"[k]nowledge cannot mean in my opinion any more than notice of facts 
such as would suggest to a reasonable man that a breach of copyright was 
being committed."109 It includes cases where parties "shut their eyes to that 
which is obvious". 110 Actual knowledge has to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. ISPs cannot be said to have actual knowledge of an infringing 
106 Husqvarna Forest & Garden Ltd v Bric/on New Zealand Ltd (1997) 6 NZBLC 99,415, 
102,244 Smellie J. 
101 Mi/well Pty Ltd v Olympic Amusement Pty Ltd ( 1999) 43 IPR 32 (FCA). 
108 Star Micronics Pty Ltd v Five Star Computers Pry Ltd [1990] 18 IPR 225, 235 (FCA) 
Davies J. 
109 Albert v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd (1921) 22 SR 75, 81 (NSW) Harvey J. 
110 LA Gear Inc v High -Tech Sports Pie [1992] FSR 121 , 128 (EWHC) Morrill J. 
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act just because they are generally aware that the information they transmit 
will contain infringing copies from time to time.
111 
The question arises when ISPs can be held to have constructive knowledge 
of an infringement. The MED suggests setting out the relevant factors for 
the determination of constructive knowledge in the legislation.
112 Because 
ISPs do not monitor the material they transmit, it is generally questionable 
whether a general awareness of copyright infringement occurring through 
their facilities can be sufficient to establish knowledge, since this 
knowledge has to be knowledge of facts.
113 This is supported by the view 
expressed by Morritt Jin LA Gear v High-Tech Sports: 
114 
"Reason to believe" must involve the concept of knowledge of 
facts from which a reasonable man would arrive at the relevant 
belief. Facts from which a reasonable man might suspect the 
relevant conclusion cannot be enough. 
The "reasonable man" test was stated in PolyGram Records v Raben 
Footwear
115 as knowledge of "facts as would suggest to a reasonable 
person, having the ordinary understanding expected of persons in the 
particular line of business, that a breach of copyright was committed." 
However, there are limits to what a defendant reasonably can believe. For 
instance, in ZYX Music v King, 
116 the defendant relied on the declaration of 
the record company that a particular song, which was distributed by the 
defendant, did not infringe copyright. Because the similarities between the 
song and another song were obvious, the Court held that the defendant had 
reason to believe. It can be concluded that the knowledge requirement 
under the secondary infringement provisions requires the defendant to 
111 Louise Longdin "Copyright and On-line Service Providers" [2000] NZLl 180, 183.
 
112 Position Paper, para 94. 
113 LA Gear Inc v High-Tech Sports Pie [1992] FSR 121, 128 (EWHC) Morritt J. 
114 LA Gear Inc v High-Tech Sports Pie [ 1992] FSR 121, I 29 (EWHC) Morrill J. 
115 PolyGram Records Inc v Raben Footwear Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 426 (FCA). 
116 ZYX Music GmbH v King [1997] 2 All ER 129 (EWCA). 
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establish facts from which reasonable grounds for their belief can be 
inferred. 117 
Therefore, according to the MED, the crucial factor in establishing 
knowledge should be a notice given by the copyright owner of the alleged 
infringement. 118 The question arises whether a receipt of a notice claiming 
a copyright infringement can be sufficient to hold an ISP to have "reason to 
believe" that there is infringement. In LA Gear, Morritt J noted that the 
requirement implied "the allowance of a period of time to enable the 
reasonable man to evaluate those facts so as to convert the facts into a 
reasonable belief."119 From these words, it appears to be very clear that 
unawareness cannot transform into constructive knowledge just by the 
mere allegation of infringement. An ISP must be given a reasonable time 
to react upon such notice. However, it appears to be difficult to determine 
such reasonable time, since there is a broad spectrum of potential cases. 
For instance, an ISP may receive a very detailed notice of a single, evident 
infringement, from which it might be obvious that there is an infraction. 
On the other end of the spectrum, an ISP might receive a mere general 
notice that a website contains an unspecified number of copyrighted files. 
In such a case, it might consume an enormous amount of time and 
resources for the ISP to arrive at a reasonable degree of belief of the 
copyright infringement. 
These examples reveal that the suggested standard of knowledge bears a 
large potential of legal uncertainty. This is amplified further by questions 
of copyright ownership. To establish a copyright infringement claim, the 
plaintiff must be the owner of the relevant copyright. However, under the 
approach in ZYX Music and Raben, the ISP will have to show that it has 
reason to believe that the claimant is not the owner of the copyright. The 
evaluation of this legal question can be very complicated. Smaller 
companies may not have the human resources to make a reliable judgement 
117 Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay /11telleclllal Property in New Zealand ( led, LexisNexis 
Bullerworths, Wellington, 200 l), para 5.12.4. 
118 Position Paper, para 94. 
119 LA Gear Inc v High-Tech Sports Pie [ 1992] FSR 121, 129 (EWHC) Morritt J. 
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on this matter. However, the test of constructive knowledge is one of facts. 
If there is knowledge of the relevant facts to arrive at the relevant belief, 
"an error of law is no excuse."
120 It is an established rule that a person who 
deliberately takes the risk that something he does is wrong cannot "say 
later that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong."
121 If an ISP 
chooses not to comply with a claim to take down allegedly infringing 
material, at least after the reasonable period of time that the LA Gear 
approach provides, because it in their opinion there is no infringement, they 
have to bear the risk that such opinion might be wrong. This leaves ISPs in 
a very vulnerable position, because any non-compliance with infringement 
notifications will bear a risk of liability. However, as pointed out before, 
this is already a feature of the current provisions . Unfortunately, the 
proposal does not remedy this situation, but leaves it to the ISP to decide 
whether an infringement notice is wa1Tanted. 
2 The infringement notice factor 
The pressure to comply with infringement notices is increased by another 
form of potential liability. ISPs have a contractual duty to provide Internet 
access or to host material to their subscribers. If an ISP blocks access to or 
removes material from the web to prevent liability for copyright 
infringement, this collides with their contractual duties in relation to their 
customers. Thus, if the blocking or removal of the material turns out to be 
unwarranted, ISPs may be found liable to their subscribers. Of course, 
ISPs will probably exclude liability in their service contracts anyway. 
However, implementing a liability exclusion clause will decrease the 
quality of the provided service, because customers are deprived of a 
contractual remedy . It also favours larger ISPs that may be able to afford 
the liability risk, and who are therefore not under the same pressure to 
exclude any liability to their customers . This could result in a fewer 
120 International Business Machines Corporation v Computer Imports Ltd [ 1989] 2 NZLR 
395, 407, 418 (HC) Smellie J. 
12 1 Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co (UK) Ltd [ 1983] FSR 545,557 (EWHC) Mervyn 
Davis QC. 
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acceptance of such contracts and, thus, fewer demand. In any case, if an 
ISP becomes known for careless blocking of material even in cases where 
the infringement is doubtful, this could damage the ISP' s reputation and 
affect its market share. 
Apart from the liability risk, the absence of a regulated notification 
procedure bears additional problems for ISPs. It can hardly be a valid aim 
of the legislation to force ISPs to act as censors. Especially because ISPs, 
at least when performing the functions at issue, merely provider the means 
that are necessary to access and make use of the Internet, they are not in the 
position to look out for potentially infringing material. Imposing such a 
duty would mean that ISPs would have to safeguard themselves against 
potential liability by hiring copyright experts, which they could hold liable 
if their assessment turns out to be wrong. There can be no doubt that this 
form of risk-management would increase the costs of Internet access, 
which is exactly what the legislation is supposed to prevent. If ISPs cannot 
resort to a reliably regulated way of dealing with infringement notices, the 
liability exemptions will hardly achieve the goal of offering some relief for 
ISPs in respect to copyright infringement liability. 
Additionally, a non-formalised infringement notice process bears a risk of 
abuse. While encouraging ISPs to block the infringing material could be 
justified in cases of undisputed copyright infringement, there may be cases 
in which the ownership of the copyright itself is in question. With business 
models such as the online distribution of music files emerging, it is likely 
that an increased number of disputes over the copyright ownership may 
arise in the cyberspace environment. The allegation of copyright 
infringement could be a powerful tool to block a competitor's website for a 
significant period of time. The implications could be severe. 
Imagine the following case: A big company runs an online music store on 
its own servers, and a smaller company runs a comparable website, which 
is hosted by an ISP, because the small company does not have the financial 
means to operate its own server . Both companies have the license to offer 
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a certain popular song for download. It would be in the interest of the big 
company to raise copyright claims and thereby cause the ISP to take the 
small company's website (or at least the relevant song file) down. When 
the file is finally accessible again, the song may not be popular anymore 
(or at least not as demanded), thus enabling the big company to concentrate 
the stream of customers of that particular song onto its own website. 
Potential liability, especially monetary liability, is a strong incentive to act. 
If the law grants ISPs a way to avoid liability, legislation has to ensure that 
such a resort is sufficiently guarded against abuse. The law has to provide 
for the prevention of unjustified use of the liability exemption provisions. 
That could be a corresponding liability of copyright owners for causing 
unwarranted blocking of material, or a requirement to file suit for copyright 
infringement if a dispute over the legitimacy of the claimed infringement 
anses. 
The United States DMCA addresses the problem as follows: 
17 USC section 512 
(g) Replacement of Removed or Disabled Material and 
Limitation on Other Liability. 
(I) No liability for taking down generally. 
Subject to paragraph (2), a service provider shall not be liable to 
any person for any claim based on the service provider's good 
faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity 
claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the 
material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing. 
The subscriber has to be notified of the takedown of the material and has 
the opportunity to file a counter notification. The ISP has to forward the 
notice to the copyright owner. If the copyright owner does not file suit 
against the alleged infringer, the ISP has to cease blocking access after 14 
business days. 
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The practical experiences with this regime are quite encouraging. From the 
copyright owner's point of view, it is fairly uncomplicated to identify the 
ISP that hosts the infringing website by employing the WHOIS database. 122 
After the contact information is ascertained, the infringement notice is filed 
via e-mail with the ISP' s designated agent. 123 Copyright owners recognise 
that the notice-and-takedown procedure under the DMCA provide them 
with a useful tool to fight copyright infringement. In practice, the process 
has worked well, as ISPs are usually ready to cooperate in order to reach 
the "safe habour". 124 From an ISP's perspective, the provision of a clear 
procedure on how to deal with potential infringement allows both parties to 
efficiently address the issue. Another positive feature is the liability on the 
part of copyright owners for any known misrepresentations made in 
relation to the takedown request. This prevents an abuse of the procedure 
and protects subscribers from groundless allegations, at least to a 
· "f" 125 s1gn1 ,cant extent. 
As the Canadian Supreme Court noted in Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers v Society of Composers with respect to the lack of such a system 
in Canada, the enactment of a statutory notice-and-takedown procedure 
would be "a more effective remedy to address this potential issue". 126 
122 Available at <http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/whois/index.jhtml> (last 
accessed 30 August 2004). 
123 Under the DMCA, all ISPs are required to designate an agent responsible for the 
receipt of infringement notices. A database of registered agents is provided by the US 
Copyright Office at <http://loc .gov/copyright/onlinesp/li st/index.html> (last accessed 30 
August 2004). 
124 Batur Oktay and Greg Wrenn " WIPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability: A Look 
back at the Notice-and-Takedown Provisions of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
One Year after Enactment" 13 <www.wipo.org> (last accessed 22 July 2004). 
125 However, according to Batur Oktay and Greg Wrenn "WIPO Workshop on Service 
Provider Liability: A Look back at the Notice-and-Takedown Provisions of the US Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act One Year after Enactment" 17 <www.wipo.org> (last accessed 
22 July 2004), there appears to be a number of "sham infringement claims" to silence 
critics, for instance by the Church of Scientology relying on questionable copyrights. 
Under the DMCA regime thi s becomes more of an iss ue between copyright owners and 
alleged infringers if they oppose the takeclown of the malerial, because the copyright 
owner has to file suit in this case to maintain the blocking of the material. 
126 Canadian Association of lntemet Providers v Society of Composers. Awhors and 
Music Publishers (2004) SCC 45, para 127 (CSC) Binnie J. 
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ISPs are arguably not in the best position to judge whether a copyright 
objection is well founded. A sensible alternative to a formalised notice-
and-takedown procedure could thus be a "RightsWatch" model as it was 
proposed in Europe some years ago. 127 The idea involves a self-regulatory 
body that acts as a neutral mediator in copyright disputes and verifies 
copyright infringement notices. If it had widespread support among 
copyright lobbies and ISPs, it could provide for a reliable notice-and-
takedown scheme. However, the prerequisite is also the major flaw of the 
model, because it never enjoyed extensive success in Europe. 
It would be beneficial to have a formalised way of dealing with 
infringement claims in the online field. If the legislator opts for 
infringement liability exemptions, it would make sense to include such a 
formalised notice-and-takedown procedure. While cases like I.A Gear 
suggest that under the present law there is also a certain period of time in 
which ISPs can assess the claim, the exact amount of time will always be 
subject to the Court's assessment of the facts in the actual case. The 
DMCA could provide a model that works in reality.
128 
Leaving the 
problems related to notice-and-takedown fully unaddressed burdens ISPs 
unilaterally, and does not provide for the legal certainty the legislation is 
aiming at. If New Zealand decides that an ISP exemption is necessary at 
all, it would be well advised to take advantage of the practical procedural 
experiences of the United States. Nothing in the MED's proposal indicates 
that it has considered adopting this approach. 
127 Nils Bortloff and Janet Henderson "WIPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability: 
Notice and Take-Down Agreements in Practice in Europe" 30 <www.wipo.org> (last 
accessed 22 July 2004). See also the Rights Watch website 
<http://www.rightswatch.com> (last accessed 26 August 2004). 
128 According to a survey, a striking feature or the notice-and-takedown procedure is that 
the infringement notifications are almost never disputed. The counter-notification rate of 
the study, which involved 47,000 cases, was less than 0.009 per cent. See Smith & 
Metalitz LLP "Proprietary Survey or Clients in the Audiovisual, Business and 
Entertainment Software, Music and Publishing Industries" (April 200 I), cited in 
"Combating Internet Copyright Crime" <http://www.publishers.org.uk>. 
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V CONCLUSION 
New Zealand is on its way to a legislation that is neither necessary nor 
likely to solve the problems it is supposed to address. Contrary to the 
assumption on which the legislation is based, ISP liability is not a key issue 
that will diminish the advantages of Internet usage and the promotion of 
electronic commerce in New Zealand. There is a reason why there has yet 
to be a single lawsuit involving ISP liability for copyright infringement. 
The proposed law causes more problems than it addresses. The 
constructive knowledge standard, which ISPs have to meet in order to fall 
under the liability exemption clauses, is difficult to determine and bears 
many uncertainties. The parallel use of constructive knowledge both in 
secondary infringement provisions and in the exemption provisions causes 
a legal 'stalemate' that effectively removes the benefit of a liability 
exemption. Moreover, the position of ISPs will in fact be worse after the 
new law comes into force. If infringement notifications become a factor on 
which knowledge can be construed, this will affect the knowledge standard 
in respect to principle liability as well. The many problems connected to a 
non-formalised infringement notice system remain unaddressed in the 
proposed legislation, which will leave ISPs in the highly unfavourable 
position of having to assess liability risks not only in respect to copyright 
owners, but also to their subscribers. The need for a reliable risk-
management will in fact increase the running costs for ISPs, who will have 
to safeguard themselves against those increased risks through the 
employment of out-of-house expertise or through insurance plans. Thus, 
the legislation will fail to support cost-effective access to the Internet. 
This would not even be a problem, if it did not contradict the primary aim 
of the legislation. However, by emphasising cost-effective access as its 
prime rationale, the legislation fails to consider other policies, which are of 
equal importance in respect to copyright in the digital age . The Internet is 
an instrument, which bears unprecedented risks for copyright owners. 
However, the legislation shifts the risk unilaterally to copyright owners and 
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spares the ones who benefit from the Internet the most: its users and 
companies making profits out of the Internet's popularity. Even if ISPs 
were held liable for secondary infringement, it cannot be doubted that the 
costs of those risks would be spread among the users through increased 
connection fees. However, it is well arguable to spread the risk among 
those who participate in and benefit from a risk, especially when the 
remedies available are of limited use. 
The New Zealand government could have well left it to the Courts to 
determine reliable rules of secondary liability in the Internet context. Law, 
and especially intellectual property law, have proven to be able to respond 
to technological innovations in the past. The development of case law, one 
might think here of the example of negligence in respect to the introduction 
of automobiles, has the advantage of a careful assessment of the Jaw and 
the thoughtful evaluation whether the Jaw is still capable of addressing the 
relevant issues in a changed environment. This rather slow progress 
prevents half-cooked solutions which are mainly dictated by suspected 
needs and which fail to consider all the necessities and implications of a 
legal problem. If potential secondary ISP liability really poses a threat to 
the growth of Internet economy, the legislator would have been well 
advised to find out whether the threat is real and whether the threat is 
senous. An incomplete solution to the supposed problem is neither 
appropriate to support the goals identified by the Ministry nor does it show 
great confidence in the proficiency of New Zealand Courts in dealing with 
copyright law issues in the digital age. 
Even if one is of the opinion that uncertainties m the law should be 
eliminated, this is not necessarily an argument in favour of a liability 
exemption. A better approach would have been to sort out the secondary 
liability rules . Providing clear rules is the real issue legislation should 
target, which would make exceptions of these rules superfluous. 
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